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The Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness
(AMORE) methodology was developed in order to translate
input degradation of military organizations into output
capability as a function of time. Because this methodology
requires an extensive amount of subjective, high resolution
input by the user, there is a need to analyze the effects of
input accuracy and of changes in the input information on
the output generated by the model. The purpose of this
research effort is to utilize sensitivity or parametric
analysis to demonstrate the needed input accuracy, and to
identify the effects of input changes on unit reconstitution
capabilities. Through an analysis of the algorithms used in
the AMORE simulation code, the assumptions and limitations
inherent in the use of this methodology are identified, and
recommendations concerning the applications of the method-
ology are provided. Recommendations for enhancements to the
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Traditionally, measures of unit effectiveness used in
combat models have been based almost exclusively on attri-
tion counts. These traditional models often use some
explicit combat defeat criterion, such as thirty percent
personnel incapacitation, to determine the viability of
simulated combat units [Ref. 1] . In models such as these,
the simulated unit reaching this criterion would be removed
from further simulation, without regard to its reconstitu-
tion capabilities. One methodology which claims to offer an
alternative to this traditional approach is called Analysis
of Military Organizational Effectiveness, or AMORE
.
The AMORE methodology was developed during the late
1970 's by Science Applications Incorporated in order to
translate input degradation of military organizations into
output capability as a function of time. In contrast to
other combat capability models, the AMORE approach treats
time as a resource, and allows for the reconstitut ion and
reorganization of military units after the onset of some
initial degradation. This methodology was formally adopted
by the U.S. Army in 1983 when the Commanding General of the
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed
that all "future requirements for new organizational designs
will be supported by AMORE" [Ref. 2]. The purpose of this
directive was to insure that new Army organizations are
structured to provide the personnel and equipment necessary
for the successful accomplishment of the organization's
mission.
The AMORE methodology requires an in-depth analysis of a
unit's mission, posture, and organization in order to
generate the input needed to drive a computer simulation of
the degradation and reconstitution processes. The degrada-
tion process is simulated using a Monte Carlo technique with
the input damage probabilities, while a transportation algo-
rithm is used to simulate the reconstitution process. The
output is expressed as a percentage of the unit's initial
capability, computed at specified user defined. time incre-
ments. The computer simulation introduces a stochastic
element to the degradation and substitution processes, but
the output is primarily derived deterministically from the
extensive user defined input required by the methodology.
This required input must be developed through a detailed
functional analysis of a unit's organization in terms of
both personnel and equipment, and must provide the following
information:
1. Initial strengths, in terms of personnel skill levels
and equipment types;
2. Substitutability , between personnel skill levels and
between equipment types, expressed in terms of the
amount of time required to effect a substitution;
3. Increments of unit capability, called mission essen-
tial teams or METs , consisting of personnel and
equipment contributing to mission accomplishment;
4. Probability of initial degradation, defined for each
personnel skill level and each equipment type;
5. Utility options as desired by the user, such as




The AMORE computer simulation requires a large volume of
item- level and individual- level input information. Because
this methodology requires an extensive amount of subjective,
high resolution input by the user, there is a need to
analyze the effects of input accuracy and of changes in the
input information on the output generated by the model. The
purpose of this research effort is to utilize sensitivity or
parametric analysis to demonstrate the needed input accu-
racy, and to identify the effects of input changes on unit
reconst itution capabilities. By identifying the assumptions
inherent in the use of this methodology and by illustrating
the effects of input changes, this investigation will
provide guidance and recommendations concerning the applica-
tions and limitations of the AMORE approach. This investi-
gation will also provide guidance and insight to users of
the AMORE model in the formulation of the required input
information for unit capability analysis.
C. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
In order to conduct this sensitivity analysis, it was
first necessary to select a suitable AMORE analysis of an
existing military organization to be used as a base case.
(Details of the base case organization are provided in
Chapter III). This base case serves as a surrogate organi-
zation for which the fundamental algorithms could be vali-
dated, the input parameters could be manipulated
selectively, and the corresponding changes iri output could
be examined comparatively.
AMORE simulations will be run on the base case, after
systematically varying each of the following selected input




1. Number of Iterations
2. Personnel Degradation Levels
3. Materiel Degradation Levels
4. Personnel Substitution Times
5. Materiel Substitution Times
6. Equipment Repair Times
7. Commander's Decision Times
8. Mission Essential Team Composition.
Through graphic representations of the output generated
by these AMORE runs, demonstrations of the effects of
changing each of the above parameters will be provided. An
analysis of the algorithms used by the AMORE model will be
conducted in order to examine the process by which the model
transforms the input information into measurements of organ-
izational capability. Based on the examination of these
analytical and graphical results, the assumptions inherent
in the use of the AMORE methodology will be identified, and
recommendations regarding the formulation of AMORE input
will be provided. Recommendations to correct any detected




II. ANALYSIS OF THE AMORE ALGORITHM
According to existing documentation, the AMORE method-
ology was specifically designed to provide the decision
maker with an improved organizational capabilities model
possessing the following features:
1. Provides for the assessment of the joint effect of
personnel casualties and materiel damage upon the
organization; and
2. Provides for the measurement of effectiveness as a
function of time after the initial degradation
[Ref. 4: p. 1-2].
The AMORE model, not unlike other capabilities models,
is an abstraction of the complex processes which determine
the true capability of an organization. However, the defi-
nition of capability used by the AMORE approach and the
simplifying assumptions used by this particular abstraction
have not been stated explicitly in any of the existing docu-
mentation. In order to identify the assumptions inherent in
the use of the AMORE methodology, an analysis of the algo-
rithms used in the model must be conducted. This analysis
examines the structures of the AMORE computer code in order
to list the assumptions and to identify the limitations
inherent in the use of these algorithms and structures.
A. THE AMORE MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
The AMORE documentation states that "the best units are
those which maximize capability for any given surviving
resources" [Ref. 4: p. 2-86]. Accordingly, the developers of
the AMORE methodology have inferred a unit design goal based




The quantification of capability for a military organi-
zation is subject to a wide range of interpretation. The
AMORE methodology defines this capability in terms of the
contribution of available assets toward mission accomplish-
ment. Contribution, as interpreted by the developers of
this methodology, can exist in two forms:
1. the availability of an asset to perform its desig-
nated mission essential function; and
2. the availability of an asset to perform a mission
essential function other than its own (via substitu-
tion) .
Based on this interpretation, the AMORE measure of
effectiveness equates the determination of cabability to the
quantification of these two forms of contribution. In order
to accomplish this quantification, the AMORE approach
requires the use of a computer simulation to accomplish two
primary functions:
1. the transformation of user provided information into
a set of assets available for contribution; and
2. the transformation of the available assets into a
measure of capability.
In this way, the AMORE approach infers that capability is a
function of availability. Instead of computing capability
measurements directly, the AMORE methodology requires the
user to specify levels of capability in increments called
mission essential teams, and the computer simulation is used
to map the availability of surviving assets onto this user
defined structure. The AMORE simulation is designed to seek
the maximum capability level, defined by the user, through
the allocation of available assets. The parameters which
determine both capability and availability are defined by
the user provided input information. A detailed explanation
of how this input information interfaces with the AMORE
algorithms is presented in the following sections.
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B. DETERMINATION OF SURVIVING ASSETS
Rather than require the user to specify a "typical" set
of surviving assets, the AMORE model uses the following
input information in order to determine one set of survi-
vors :
1. initial strengths, defined for each personnel skill
level and for each type of equipment ; and
2. probabilities of degradation, defined for each
personnel skill level and for each type of equipment.
Based on this information, a Monte Carlo technique is run
for each person and for each item of equipment in order to
determine the elements of the set of surviving assets.
This process occurs in a subroutine which is imbedded
within an iteration loop. The purpose of the iteration loop
is to generate output based on a sample consisting of
numerous sets of surviving assets, as opposed to output
based on an average set of survivors.
C. TRANSFORMATION OF ASSETS INTO CAPABILITY
The AMORE algorithm transforms each set of surviving
assets into a measure of organizational capability. This
transformation primarily involves a comparison between the
current set of assets available and the set of assets
required to achieve some predetermined level of capability.
Through the input of a mission essential team structure,
the user has defined levels of capability based upon the
assets required to fulfill each level. For example, in the
base case organization, 8 mission essential teams (or levels
of capability) were established as input. Based on this
input, first level of capability requires that all the
assets of the first team be fulfilled; the second level of
capability requires that all the assets of the first two
teams be fulfilled; ect . In this way, capability, defined
15
for the base case by 8 teams or increments, is specified in
terms of 8 sets of required assets. The mission essential
team information input by the user provides the structure
against which the set of surviving assets can be compared.
In conducting this comparison, the AMORE model seeks the
highest level of required assets that can be satisfied by
the surviving assets. It accomplishes this by recognizing
that some surviving assets may be substituted for others at
a cost. The cost is expressed in terms of time, and this
information is provided by the user in the following forms
of input: substitution times, repair times, and decision
times
.
In order to find the highest level of capability that
can be satisfied by a given set of surviving assets, the
AMORE algorithm seeks a feasible solution to a linear
program formulated as an assignment problem. This formula-
tion is displayed in Figure 2.1.
The costs, C. .
,
are defined by the transfer times
provided by the user. The set of available assets, S ., is
defined by the set of survivors for the current iteration.
The user provided mission essential team structure defines
numerous sets of required assets, sets of D-. One set of
required assets, D-, is defined for each level of capability
specified by the MET structure.
The AMORE algorithm is structured to make successive
calls to a subroutine which seeks a feasible solution to
this assignment problem. Each call is made using a
different set of D. values until the highest level of D.
values for which an optimal feasible solution exists is
identified. This set of values corresponds to a specific
mission essential team number. This number is then
expressed as a fraction of the total number of teams
possible, as permitted by the input MET structure. This
fraction of total capability is interpreted by the
16
i = 1,2, ... ,m Survivor type (assignee)
J = 1,2, . .
.
,n Requirement type (assignment)
S.
1
Quantity of type i available
d
j
Quantity of type j required
xij Number of assignments, i to j
c. .
ID
Cost of assignment, i to j(in time units)
Minimize I E c i:x i:
i j
Subject to: Y Xij <S i for all i
* *
j




Figure 2.1 Assignment Problem Formulation.
developers of the AMORE methodology to represent a quantifi-
cation of the organizational capability of the given set of
surviving assets.
For each iteration, this entire procedure is repeated
twice; once for personnel assets and once again for materiel
assets. In this way, the AMORE model treats the contribu-
tion of personnel assets separately from and independently
of the contribution of materiel assets. Two measures of
capability, one for personnel and another for materiel, are
computed for each iteration. The model then selects the
minimum of these two capability values, and the minimum
value selected is then recorded as the maximum capability
17
for the given organization for that iteration. This entire
process is imbedded within an iteration loop, and upon




After the AMORE model has determined the highest level
of requirements (D- values) which can be satisfied by avail-
able assets, it then determines the assignments to be made
in order to achieve this level. In this way, the solution
to the problem shown in Figure 2.1 (the X— values) speci-
fies the assignments to be made. These assignments are made
according to the times when the designated assets become
available. Each asset becomes available upon expiration of
its respective and applicable substitution, repair, and
decision times. Thus, the AMORE algorithm maps the avail-
ability of assets into an array indexed by time increments.
This mapping is then used to determine the highest level of
capability that can be satisfied at any given time increment
following the initial degradation. The user can specify up
to thirty time increments, and the model will provide capa-
bility measurements at each of these increments. According
to the AMORE User's Handbook, this procedure provides the
user with an indication of organizational recovery rate.
It should be noted that the recovery rate reported by
the AMORE model is not necessarily the maximum recovery rate
possible. The user must be aware that the reported rate is
based on a solution to the problem which maximizes capa-
bility, not recoverability . The reported rate is an indica-
tion of the availability of those assets which are required
to achieve the highest possible level of capability.
Recovey rates based on sub-optimal solutions to the assign-
ment problem are not reported by the model.
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E. COST OF ASSIGNMENTS
The AMORE methodology recognizes that surviving assets
may be substituted to perform the mission essential func-
tions associated with other assets. Substitutions are
allowed at a cost, and this cost is expressed in units of
time which are input by the user as transfer times.
According to existing documentation, changing the transfer
times will change the rate of recovery, but will not change
the total capability recovered [Ref. 4: p. 2-86]. However,
it can be demonstrated that, by increasing selected transfer
time values, higher levels of total capability can result.
(See Chapter VI)
.
This suggests that, by increasing the costs, an optimal
feasible solution can be found to satisfy a higher level of
demands (a more restrictive set of D- values). Examination
of the objective function in Figure 2.1 reveals that this is
not possible unless the increase in costs, Cj_-:
,
is accompa-
nied by a change in the feasible region. The feasible
region is defined by the constraint equations in Figure 2.1,
which in turn are defined by the set of surviving assets and
the set of required assets. The sets of required assets are
established by the input MET structure and are not influ-
enced by changes in input. C- • values. However, the sets of
surviving assets are determined by a Monte Carlo process
which draws upon a pseudo-random number stream generated in
a subroutine of the AMORE program.
Examination of the sets of surviving assets generated by
the base case AMORE run reveals that these sets are
different from the sets generated by another AMORE run using
the base case input data modified by increased transfer
times. This gives an indication that changes in input
transfer times can cause the model to draw random numbers
from another section of the generated stream. This can
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result in a different sample of sets of surviving assets for
each complete AMORE run. Based on this observation, it is
possible for the AMORE model to generate output which
suggests that a higher level of capability may be achieved
by increasing the transfer times. Because the structure of
the AMORE algorithm allows this situation to exist, it is
recommended that the user examine the confidence intervals
which are provided as output for each of the capability
values reported. When comparing the results of. two or more
complete runs, an examination of these confidence intervals
will indicate if a significant difference exists between the
maximum capabilities reported for each run. If a signifi-
cant difference is found to exist, the user should increase
the number of iterations and repeat the trials necessary for
the comparison.
F. ASSUMPTIONS INHERENT IN THE MODEL
Based on an examination of the algorithms used in the
AMORE program, the following assumptions inherent in the use
of this model have been identified.
1. Capability can be quantified by measuring avail-
ability. The model assumes that each available asset
will perform a mission essential function at an
acceptable level of performance. Based on this
assumption, the AMORE model measures exclusively the
availability, not the performance, of each surviving
asset
.
2. Capability can be defined in discrete increments.
The methodology requires that the user specify these
increments as input to the model.
3. Increments of capability are additive. This assump-
tion also suggests that the relationship between the
number of increments and the levels (percentages) of
20
capability is linear. However, the relationship
between the number of assets and the capability
levels is not necessarily linear. The number of
assets per increment (MET) is defined by the user,
and the user is not restricted to assigning an equal
number of assets to each increment. Therefore, even
if the user defines the mission essential teams in a
non-homogenous manner, the AMORE model will treat all
mission essential teams as equally weighted incre-
ments of capability.
Maximum capability is determined independent of time.
The model is structured to first conduct a feasi-
bility check, which determines the maximum capability
level that can be satisfied by the surviving assets,
regardless of time. The algorithm then seeks to
minimize time in the allocation of resources required
to achieve this maximum level.
Personnel and materiel assets can be considered inde-
pendently in the measurement of capability. The
AMORE model is structured to consider personnel and
materiel assets separately in determining capability
levels. No synergistic effects between personnel and
materiel assets are represented.
Surplus assets do not contribute to capability. The
model is structured to allocate resources to discrete
sets defined by user provided input. Surplus assets
are considered by the model to contribute no addi-
tional value toward capability, unless the next
entire increment is completed.
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III. THE BASE CASE
A. SELECTION OF THE BASE CASE
An existing military organization was selected from a
collection of completed AMORE analyses to provide the basis
for parametrically analyzing the AMORE model. The input for
this base case simulation could then be selectively changed
to examine the effects on the output.
An appropriate base case organization would have to
offer sufficient flexibility in terms of personnel skill
levels, equipment types, and mission essential team composi-
tion, in order to make the desired changes to the input
parameters. Several U.S. Army company-sized organizations
were found to provide this flexibility. The organization
selected for use as the base case is the Division-86 155mm
Howitzer Battery, a Field Artillery unit consisting of 129
personnel and 76 major equipment items. This unit was
selected because its wide range of personnel skill levels
permits a flexible rearrangement of these personnel into
several different mission essential team structures. A
completed AMORE study, which compares the capabilities of
alternative Division-86 155mm Howitzer Batteries, was
published by Science Applications, Inc. (SAI) in July 1982
[Ref. 3]. This study served as a reference and source of
information from which the input parameters used to run the
base case simulation were developed.
B. COMPOSITION OF THE BASE CASE UNIT
The 129 personnel assigned to the Division-86 155mm
Howitzer Battery are organized into sections as shown in
Table I. This battery consists of eight howitzer sections
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TABLE I
Personnel, Division-86 155mm Howitzer Battery
KANK/
SECTION SKILL GRADE MOS NO.
BTRY HQS BTRY CDR CPT 13E00
FIRST SGT E-8 13YM5
FOOD SVC SGT E-7 94B40
SPLY SGT E-6 76Y40
NBC NCO E-5 54E20




VEH DVR E-3 13B10
COMMO SECT TAC COM CH E-6 31V30
TAC WIRE OP CH E-5 36K20
TAC WIRE OP SPEC E-4 35K10
TAC WIRE OP SPEC E-3 36K10
2 FIR PLT HQ PLT LDR LT 13E00 2
PLT SGT E-7 13B40 2
VEH DVR E-3 13310 4
2 FDC FIRE DIR OFF LT 13E00 2
CH FD CMPTR E-6 13E30 2
SR FD SPEC E-5 13E20 2
FD SPEC E-4 13E10 2
CP CARRIER DVR E-4 13E10 2
FD SPEC E-3 13E10 4
8-KOW SECT CH SECT E-6 13B30 8
GUNNER E-5 13320 8
AMMO TM CH E-5 13E20 8
CANNONEER/
ASSEMBLER E-4 13810 8
AMMO SPT VEH DVR E-4 13B10 8
SP HO*' DVR E-4 13310 8
CANNONEER E-3 13310 32
2 AMMO SECT SECT CH E-6 13B30 2
AMMO SPEC E-4 13310 2
AMMO HANDLER E-3 13B10 2
SR AMMO VEH OP E-5 64C20 2






Division-86 155mm Howitzer Battery
SECTION EQUIPMENT NO.
BTRY HQ Radio Set AN/VRC 46. 2
TRK, Utility, 1/4 ton, w/e. 2
TKK, Cargo, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6. 2
TRLR, Cargo 1/4 ton, 2 whl
.
2
TRLR, Cargo, 1 1/2 ton, 2 whl 1
TRLR, Tank, Water, 400 gal. 1
COMMO SETC TRK, Cargo, 1/14 ton, 6x6. 1
TRL, Cargo, 3/4 ton, 2 whl. 1
FIR PLT HQ Aiming Circle. 6
Radio Set AN/VRC-46. 2
TRK, Utility, 1/4 ton, 4x4. 2
TRK, Cargo, 1 1/4 ton, 6x6. 2
TRK, Cargo, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6. 2
TRL, Cargo, 1/4 ton. 2
TRL, Cargo, 1 1/2 ton, 2 wh. 2
2 FDC Carrier, CP, Lt. Trk. 2
Computer, Gun Direction 2
FD Set Artillery. 4
Gen Set, Gas Eng. 4
Radio Set, AN/VRC-46. 6
8 HOW SECT Carrier, Cargo, Trkd, 6 ton. 8
How, Med, SP, 155mm. 8
2 AMMO SECT GOER, 8 ton. 6
TRL, AMMO, 1 1/2 ton, 2 whl. 6
which are capable of operating in either a consolidated
battery configuration or as separate four gun platoons, each
with an associated platoon headquarters, fire direction
center, and ammunition section. The Battery Headquarters
section provides command and control, supply, food service,
and NBC support, while communications support is provided by
a separate Communications Section. The significant items of
equipment for this battery, as specified by Table of
Organization and Equipment (TOE) 6-367J, are presented in
Table II.
24
C. INPUT TRANSFER MATRICES, PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
The AMORE methodology requires as input an indication of
which personnel skills can substitute for other skills.
This required information is expressed in units of time, and
it is input in the form of a personnel transfer matrix. The
personnel transfer matrix for the base case organization is
presented in Table III. The thirty-five skill levels
present in the howitzer battery are arrayed in rows down the
left side of the matrix and in columns across the top of the
matrix. The entries in this matrix represent the amount of
time, in minutes, required by the row skill level to substi-
tute for the column skill level. Zeroes are entered along
the main diagonal of this matrix, indicating that each indi-
vidual can substitute for himself with zero time delay. The
dashes in the matrix indicate that the personnel skill in
that particular row cannot, or would not, substitute for the
skill represented in that column (e.g. , the cook in row 8
could not substitute for the battery commander in column 1
and the first sergeant in row 2 would not, although he
could, substitute for the cannoneer in column 30).
An indication of equipment substitutability must also be
input in the form of a transfer matrix. A substitutability
mapping for the base case significant equipment items was
developed, and is displayed in Table IV.
D. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS (METS)
In order to compute unit reconstitut ion capability, the
AMORE methodology also requires an indication of incremental
unit capability, defined in terms of mission essential
teams. Reconst itution capability is then determined by the
number of teams which can be formed over time, after some
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Tac Comm Ch 1
Tac Wire Ch 1
Tac Wire Sp 1
Tac Wire Sp 1
Pit Ldr 1 1
Pit Sgt 1 1
Veh Dvr 2 1 1
Fire Dir Off 1
Ch FD Cmptr 1




Ch Sect 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gunner 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ammo Tm Ch 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cannoneer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ammo Veh Dvr 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SP How Dvr 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cannoneer 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ammo Sect Ch 1 1
Ammo Spec 1 1
Ammo Hdlr 1 1
Sr Ammo Dvr 1 1
Ammo Dvr 1 1 1 1
For the base case organization, the mission essential
teams are defined in terms of howitzer sections. The base
case mission essential teams, defined for personnel, are
displayed in Table V. The base case mission essential
teams, defined for equipment, are presented in Table VI.
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TABLE VI


















Trk Ut 1/4T 1
Trk Cgo 2.5T
Trl Cgo 1/4T 1
Trl Cgo 1.5T
Trl Tank Wtr
Trk Cgo 5/4T 1
Trl Cgo 1/4T 1
Aiming Circl 1 1 1 1
Radio AN/VRC 1 1
Trk Ut 1/4T 1 1
Trk Cgo 5/4T
Trk Cgo 2.5T
Trl Cgo 1/4T 1 1




Gen Set , Gas 1
Radio AN/VRC 3
Trk Cgo 6T 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
How, 155SP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trk Cgo 5T 1 1 1 1 1 1
Trl Ammo 1 1 1 1 1 1
This mission essential team structure is based on the 1982
SAI Report [Ref. 3: p. 2-18] which presents the following
considerations in forming the METs
:
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To form the first MET, there is need for a howitzer
section, a minimal communications section, a fire
direction center, and one element of an ammunition
section. With only a single howitzer section, there
is no need for either a platoon leader or a battery
commander. Two drivers are included in the platoon
headquarters, however, to drive the battery nuclear
load vehicles
.
With the addition of the second howitzer section, it
is necessary to add the platoon leader, platoon serg-
eant, and driver. A second element of the ammunition
section is also needed.
The addition of the third howitzer section requires
only the addition of the remaining element of the
first ammunition section while the addition of the
fourth howitzer section requires no additions from
the remainder of the battery.
The battery commander, first sergeant, and driver are
added with the addition of the fifth howitzer section
when the span of control capability of the first
platoon leader begins to be exceeded.
The second platoon leader, platoon sergeant, driver
and a wireman are added with the sixth howitzer
section when splitting the battery into two 3-gun
platoons becomes a possibility.
The addition of the three elements of the second
ammunition section occurs with howitzer sections
five, six and seven respectively.
No food service, supply, or NBC personnel are consid-
ered essential at any team level.
31




In order to simulate an initial degradation of the
unit under study, the AMORE methodology requires as input
probabilities of degradation. Different probabilities can
be entered for each personnel skill level and equipment
type. For materiel, AMORE requires that degradation prob-
abilities be defined for light, moderate and heavy damage.
For the base case, an input degradation probability
of 20% was used for all personnel skill levels. The
materiel damage probabilities used were based on the number
of rounds of enemy artillery required to inflict the desig-
nated level of personnel damage. These materiel degradation
probabilities are: for light damage, 31%; for moderate
damage, 16%; and for heavy damage, 14%.
2 Repair and Decision Times
The AMORE methodology requires that the repair times
for lightly and moderately damaged equipment be provided for
each equipment type. The methodology does not permit
repairs on materiel receiving heavy damage. For the base
case, repair times were set at zero minutes for lightly
damaged equipment, and at one minute for all moderately
damaged equipment
.
The AMORE methodology also provides for the simula-
tion of delays in equipment substitutions, due to the addi-
tional time required by the unit commander to decide on the
substitutions to be made. For the base case, ' all decision
times were set at zero minutes.
It may seem apparent that the repair times and the
decision times used as input for the base case do not
provide realistic estimates of these events. However, these
times were selected to facilitate the analysis of the base
32
case output, and to establish some base-line values upon
which a sensitivity analysis could be conducted.
F. BASE CASE OUTPUT
The transfer times for materiel and personnel and the
repair times for materiel are treated as means of exponen-
tially distributed random variables, according to the AMORE
User's Handbook [Ref. 4: p. 2-7]. The times used during the
simulation are sampled from the distributions described by
the mean times. However, if the user desires to supress
this sampling, a "mean time only" option may be selected.
The user also has the ability to select the number of itera-
tions to be run, and the AMORE output is based on the
average of all iterations.
A 50-iteration run of the base case was conducted using
the input described in the preceding paragraphs and using
the mean time only option. Output from this run, shown in
Table VII, reveals the mean fraction of capability for
personnel and materiel evaluated at each of the user speci-
fied time slices. The column labelled "Minimum" contains
the average values, for all iterations, of the minimum of
the personnel and materiel capabilities. To illustrate how
to read the output, note that after 0.75 hours, personnel
regained a mean capability of 77.0 percent, while materiel
reached a mean capability of 86.2 percent with a minimum or
unit mean capability being 74.7 percent at that time. A 90
percent confidence limit , shown to the right of each of the
mean capabilities, is also provided.
The unit capability values found in the Minimum Column
of Table VII were plotted against the designated time
values, and the resulting graph is displayed in Figure 3.1.
This graphical representation can be used to provide a
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ITERATIONS 5C>
example, another 50- iteration run of the base case was
conducted. However, this version of the base case was run
without invoking the "mean time only" option. The resulting
AMORE "curve" is presented in Figure 3.2. Comparison of the
graphs in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provides a visual indication
regarding the effects of using the "mean time only" option.
In a similar manner, comparisons of graphical represen-
tations of the AMORE output is used in subsequent chapters


































Figure 3.2 Base Case Output (with exponential sampling)
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IV. NUMBER OF ITERATIONS
The number of iterations for the AMORE simulation must
be specified by the user. An examination of the AMORE model
structure, shown in Figure 4.1, reveals that an iteration
loop is nested within the simulation loop. Each iteration
consists of applying damage to the unit's personnel and
equipment, assessing the number of surviving assets,
reconstituting mission essential teams, and calculating unit
capability at the designated time slices.
Degradation to the unit's personnel and materiel is
applied using a Monte Carlo technique based on the input
damage probabilities. All calculations are made following
each application of the degradation, and the results are
then averaged over all the iterations. These results repre-
sent the average capability of the unit given many samples
of surviving assets as opposed to the capability of the unit
given an average set of survivors. Therefore, the number of
iterations selected by the user represents the number of
stochastic applications of the degradation process, and
sufficient iterations are required for the necessary conver-
gence of the results. According to the AMORE User's
Handbook [Ref. 4], between twenty-five and fifty iterations
have been found to provide generally acceptable convergence.
An examination was conducted in order to demonstrate the
effects of the choice of the number of iterations on the
AMORE simulation output. A series of AMORE simulations were
run using the base case input data and using iteration
counts of 5, 20, 50, and 99. This procedure was repeated
for three levels of degradation, specified by the three sets
of damage probabilities (refered to as PD Sets) listed in
















PROCESSING PARAMETERS (OUTPUT OPTIONS, ETC.)
UNIT INVENTORY (NO. OF PEOPLE & AMOUNT 0? EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING SPARES)
TEAM REQUIREMENTS (NO. OF PEOPLE h AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT)
TIME PARAMETERS (TIMESLICES, TRANSFERS, REPAIRS)
RULES FOR SUBSTITUTING SKILLS k EQUIPMENT (TRANSFER MATRICES)
-READ IN PROBABILITIES OF DEGRADATION (PDs) FOR THE INVENTORY AND





APPLY PERSONNEL DAMAGE RANDOMLY AND AGGREGATE SURVIVORS
BY SKILL CATEGORY
r—BY MISSION:
- DETERMINE C"TIHAL (MINIMUM TIKI) NO. OF TEAMS
- DETERMINE NO. Or TEAMS RECONSTITUTED AT SPECIFIED
TIME SLICES
- CALCULATE RECORD OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS FOR
TEAMS BUILT
- CALCULATE RECORD OF NEEDS & SURPLUSES FOR NEXT
HIGHER NUMSER OF TEAMS (CHOKE ANALYSIS)
GO TO NEXT MISSION
AT END: BEGIN MATERIEL LOOP
APPLY MATERIEL DAMAGE RANDOMLY 4 AGGREGATE SURVIVORS BY
MATREIEL CATEGORY FOR NO, LIGHT, & MODERATE DAMAGE
r*-6Y MISSION:
- DETERMINE MAXIMUM NO. OF TEAMS IN THE MINIMUM
AMOUNT OF TIME
- DETERMINE NO. OF TEAMS RECONSTITUTED AT
SPECIFIED TIME SLICES
- CALCULATE RECORD OF MATERIEL ASSIGNMENTS FOR
TEAMS BUILT
- CALCULATE RECORD OF NEEDS « SURPLUSES FOR NEXT
HIGHER NUM3ER G~ TEAMS (CHOKE ANALYSIS)
— - GO TO NEXT MISSION
AT END: CALCULATE STATISTICS FOR THIS ITERATION
GO TO NEXT ITERATION
AT END: - AFTER LAST ITERATION CALCULATE EXPECTED VALUES & ASSOCIATED
CON r IDENCE UNITS
- PRINT OUT RESULTS C r METHODOLOGV AYERAGED OVER ALL
ITERATION'S TO OUTPUT
— - GO TO NEXT SET OF PDs
AT END: - AFTER LAST SET OF PDs. END PROGRAM
Figure 4.1 AMORE Simulation Structure.
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TABLE VIII












PD SET 1 10% 13% 8% 5%
PD SET 2 20% 31% 16% 10%
PD SET 3 30% 32% 22% 14%
The output from these simulations is graphically
displayed in Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. Examination of the
output displayed in Figure 4.2 reveals an indication of
convergence after (to the right of) the 0.4 hour time value.
However, in the interval between and 0.4 hours, there
appears to be noticeable differences in output capability
produced by varying the iteration counts. In this interval,
the output values appear to converge to those values
produced by the highest iteration count used (ie. 99).
Although differences in output values do exist, there is no
indication of a lack of convergence. Figure 4.3 reveals
consistent results for all four iteration counts used.
These results do support the guidance provided in the
AMORE User's Handbook suggesting that 25 or more iterations
are necessary to produce acceptable output values.
Increasing the number of iterations will permit the AMORE
simulation to calculate unit capability based on an
increased number of samples of surviving assets. Increasing
the sample size should provide a better estimate of the unit
capability, while providing a narrower confidence interval
for this estimate.
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Figure 4.2 Results using PD SET 1.
Users of the AMORE model should select an iteration
count sufficiently large enough to ensure statistically
acceptable results. This can be done by running the AMORE
simulation with the number of iterations set to 25 or more,
and then examining the results to insure that the confidence
intervals are within the desired limits. Confidence inter-
vals, based on a t-test of significance for a 90% confidence
interval, are provided as output by the model. If not
39
Effects of Varying Iteration Counts
= number of iterations
1 = 5: solid line
I = 20 : dotted line
I = 50 : dashed line
I = 99 : dot-dashed line
0.4 0.8 1.2
Time (hrs)
Figure 4.3 Results using PD SET 2.
satisfied, the user may increase the number of iterations,
as permitted by local computer resources.
When higher levels of degradation are used, considera-
tion should be given to increasing the number of iterations.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the effects of using an insufficient
number of iterations while using a higher level of degrada-
tion, PD Set 3. Notice that the output capability values
produced by using 20 iterations differ from the other output
40
Effects of Varying Iteration Counts
I = number of iterations
1 = 5: solid line
1 = 20 : dotted line








Figure 4.4 Results using PD SET 3.
values generated. These observed differences do not neces-
sarily indicate a lack of convergence. The values produced
by using 20 iterations are the result of averaging the capa-
bility values obtained from 20 particular samples of
surviving assets. It is possible that averaging from a
small sample size, such as 20, would yield different results
from those obtained from larger samples, particularly when
higher levels of degradation are used. Using an increased
41
number of iterations would increase the number of samples of
surviving assets used in determining the average capability
values. Therefore, it is recommended that consideration
should be given to increasing the number of iterations when
higher levels of degradation are used.
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V. DEGRADATION LEVELS
The AMORE methodology requires that the user specify as
input the probabilities of degradation (PD) for each
personnel skill level and for each equipment type. The
model simulates personnel degradation by generating for each
individual a uniformly distributed random variable which is
compared to the input PD for that individual's skill group.
If this random variable is less than the specified PD, the
individual is declared a casualty and is considered not
available for contribution to unit capability.
For the simulation of materiel degradation, the model
requires a set of three PDs for each equipment type. These
PDs correspond to three levels of damage: light, moderate,
and severe. For each item of equipment, a uniform random
number is generated and is compared to these PDs in order to
determine which category of damage is assessed against each
equipment item. Items assessed as lightly or moderately
damaged become available after a delay based on time
required for repairs. Items assessed as severely damaged
are not considered available for contribution to unit
capability
.
The user's selection of PDs must be based on an analysis
of:
1. the scenario(s) to be considered;
2. the unit's mission(s);
3. the unit's configuration and defensive posture;
4. and the source of degradation (ie. the attacking
weapon systems).
The User's Handbook [Ref. 4: p. 2-76] suggests that this
analysis be made with the aid of data provided in the Joint
Munitions Effectiveness Manuals ( JMEM) . Given a specific
43
scenario, a unit configuration, and an attacking weapon
system, JMEM-based analysis can provide source data and
probabilities for relative losses of specified items and
personnel
.
Effects of Changing Personnel Degradation Levels
(with no materiel degradation)
Personnel Degradation Probability = .10
++S^
Personnel Degradation Probability = .20
Personnel Degradation Probability = .30
„/"" Personnel Degradation Probability = .40
» 9 er
Personnel Degradation Probability = .50
9 9 O
Personnel Degradation Probability = .60
9 9 9 9 • 9—• 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Personnel Degradation Probability = .70
9 9 9 9 9 9 9- -9 9 9 9 9 9 9—9-
Time (hours)
Figure 5.1 Personnel Degradation Levels.
In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the AM0RE
simulation to changes in input PDs , the base case was run
using various levels of degradation. Degradation
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probabilities ranging from 10% to 70% were applied to all
personnel skill levels. In order to isolate the effects of
personnel degradation on unit capability, equipment prob-
abilities of degradation were set to 0, and the mean time
only option used. The results of these runs are displayed
in Figure 5.1. As expected, unit capability values progres-















Level 1 0% 8% 3% 0%
Level 2 0% 13% 8% 5%
Level 3 0% 18% 13% 10%
Level 4 0% 23% 18% 15%
Level 5 0% 33% 28% 25%
Level 6 0% 38% 33% 30%
Level 7 0% 48% 38% 40%
In order to isolate the effects of materiel degradation
on unit capability, this procedure was repeated with
personnel PDs set to 0. The materiel degradation levels
used are listed in Table IX, and the results of these runs
are displayed in Figure 5.2. Again, the unit capability
values can be seen to decrease progressively as the PD
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values for materiel are increased. The relative flatness of
the curves in Figure 5.2 reflects the short (in most cases
0) equipment transfer times and repair times used in the
base case. Had values other than been used for materiel
transfer times, this flatness would not have been observed.
The effects of changes in transfer times on the unit capa-







Effects of Changing Materiel Degradation Levels
(with no personnel degradation)
Materiel Degradation Level 1
—
• • ••••••••• •••••••• o
Materiel Degradation Level 2







» ,• • »i« m • — c
Materiel Degradation Level 3
Materiel Degradation Level 4
Materiel Degradation Level 5
Materiel Degradation Level 6
Materiel Degradation Level 7
Time (hours)
Figure 5,2 Materiel Degradation Levels
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VI. TRANSFER TIME
A. TOTAL TRANSFER TIME
After the onset of some initial degradation, a unit
commander must take actions to reconstitute the unit in
order to re-establish maximum unit capability. These
actions entail the reallocation of available personnel and
materiel assets in an attempt to fulfill mission essential
requirements. In order to simulate the availability of
these resources, the AMORE methodology requires as input an
indication of:
1. the time necessary for the substitution of one
personnel skill level for another;
2. the time necessary for the substitution of one equip-
ment type for another;
3. the time necessary for the repair of damaged equip-
ment
;
4. the time required by the unit commander to assess the
situation and make decisions regarding substitutions.
The AMORE methodology defines the total transfer time for a
particular personnel skill level to be the sum of the
substitution time and the commander's decision time for that
particular skill level. Similarly, the total transfer time
for a particular equipment type is defined to be the sum of
the substitution time, the commander's decision time, and
the repair time for that particular equipment type. This
total transfer time determines when an individual person or
piece of equipment becomes available for substitution or




The AMORE methodology requires that the user specify the
components of total transfer time for each personnel skill
level and for each equipment type. Because this large
amount of input information is dependent upon the subjective
evaluation of the user, an analysis was conducted to examine
the effects of changes in each of the following components
of total transfer time: personnel substitution times;
equipment substitution times; equipment repair times; and
commander's decision times. The results of this analysis
are presented in the .following sections.
B. PERSONNEL SUBSTITUTION TIMES
The time required for the substitution of one personnel
skill level for another is input in the form of a substitu-
tion matrix called the personnel transfer matrix. Matrix
entries represent the time (in minutes) necessary for the
substitution to be operational with an acceptable degree of
performance. These times are an indication of how long it
would take for an individual in one skill category to become
oriented in the mission essential tasks required by another
skill category [Ref. 4: p. 2-12].
In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the AMORE
simulation to changes in the personnel transfer matrix,
three variations of the base case were run. For each of the
three variations, all the entries in the base case personnel
transfer matrix were multiplied by a constant factor. The
factors used were 0.5, 2.0, and 3.0. These trials were run
without invoking the mean time only option, and the results
of these trials were compared to the results of the base
case. These results, displayed in Figure 6.1, illustrate
the effects of changing all the entries in the personnel
transfer matrix while holding all other inputs constant.
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Effects of Changing Personnel Substitution Tim es
S
Solid Line: Base Case Personnel Substitution Times
Dotted Line: Base Case Personnel Substitution Times x .5
Dashed Line: Base Case Personnel Substitution Times x 2.0
Dot-Dashed Line: Base Case Personnel Substitution Times x 3.0
Time (hours)
Figure 6.1 Changing Personnel Substitution Times.
Changing the times in the personnel transfer matrix
should change the rate of recovery. These changes should
not alter the total capability recovered. Examination of
the AMORE curves in Figure 6.1 reveals no indication of
unexpected results. Decreases in recovery rates are
evident, and the maximum capability reached by each of the
runs remained unchanged.
49
C. EQUIPMENT SUBSTITUTION TIMES
The time required for the substitution of one equipment
type for another is input in the form of an equipment
transfer matrix. The equipment transfer matrix is developed
in a manner similar to the personnel transfer matrix. The
entries in the equipment transfer matrix represent the time
(in minutes) needed to reposition the equipment item to be
substituted and to perform any modifications or adaptations
to the item.
In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the AMORE
methodology to changes in the equipment transfer matrix,
three variations of the base case were run. For each of
these three variations, the entries in the base case equip-
ment transfer matrix were modified by adding a constant
factor to each base case entry. The results, displayed in
Figure 6.2, illustrate the effects of changing all the
entries in the equipment transfer matrix while holding all
other input constant.
An increase in the equipment substitution times should
result in a decreased rate of recovery, while the total
capability recovered should remain the same. These expected
outcomes are evident in the curves shown in Figure 6.2, and
there appears to be no indication of a misrepresentation of
expected results.
D. EQUIPMENT REPAIR TIMES
After the application of the degradation process, each
item of equipment is categorized as undamaged, lightly
damaged, moderately damaged or severely damaged. Undamaged
items are available for immediate contribution to unit capa-
bility, while severely damaged items are considered not
available for any contribution to cabability. Equipment
items assessed as lightly or moderately damaged become
50
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Figure 6.2 Changing Equipment Substitution Times.
available after a delay based on the time required for
repairs. The AM0RE methodology requires as input an indica-
tion of the times required for the repair of lightly and
moderately damaged equipment.
In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the AM0RE
methodology to changes in the input repair times, the base
case was run using various sets of repair time inputs. The
effects of increasing equipment repair times are displayed
51
E. COMMANDER'S DECISION TIME
In order to simulate the need for the unit commander to
assess the condition of the unit and to decide how to reorg-
anize, the AMORE methodology requires that an indication of
the commander's decision time be provided by the user. The
user has the ability to specify a particular decision time
for each personnel skill level and for each equipment type.
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Figure 6.4 Changing Commander's Decision Times
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In order to examine the effects of changes in command-
er's decision time, four trials were conducted using deci-
sion times of 15, 30, 45, and 60 minutes. For each of these
trials, the specified decision times were applied to all
personnel skill levels and equipment types. The outcome of
these trials were compared to the outcome of the base case
(decision times = 0), and the results are displayed in
Figure 6.4.
The results in Figure 6.4 indicate that, by progres-
sively increasing the commander's decision times, the rate
of unit recovery progressively decreases. However, closer
examination reveals that the maximum capability achieved in
each of the runs were not the same. It was suspected that
this anomaly may have been caused as the result of not
invoking the "mean time only" option. When this option is
not invoked, the total transfer times required for personnel
and equipment are sampled from exponential distributions
with means determined by the input data. Invoking the "mean
time only" option can be used to eliminate the exponential
random sampling of total transfer times in the AMORE
simulation.
In order to re-examine the irregularities observed in
Figure 6.4, another trial was run setting commander's deci-
sion time to 60 minutes for all personnel and equipment, and
using the "mean time only" option. The results of this
trial were compared to the results of the base case run
(decision times =0). A comparison of the results is
presented in Figure 6.5.
Examination of Figure 6.5 reveals that increasing the
decision times decreases the rate of recovery as expected.
However, the maximum capability achieved by this trial
(decision times = 60 minutes) exceeds the maximum capability
achieved by the base case (decision times =0). These obser-
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Figure 6.5 Changing Commander's Decision Times.
AMORE simulation to suggest that increases in delay times
may increase unit capability.
Examination of the AMORE algorithms reveals that the
input commander's decision times are simply added to the
input substitution times for the designated personnel and
equipment [Ref. 5]. Based on this fact, it should be
possible to observe the same results seen in Figure 6.5 by
an appropriate selection of input personnel and equipment
55
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Figure 6.6 Changes to Selected Substitution Times.
substitution times. In order to demonstrate this, another
trial was conducted. For this trial, the commander's deci-
sion times were set to 0, and increased transfer times were
applied to selected entries in the base case personnel and
equipment substitution matrices. The results of this trial
are displayed in Figure 6.6. Again, the results of the
AMORE simulation indicate that a higher level of unit capa-
bility can be attained by introducing delays (increasing
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input substitution times). These AMORE derived results can
be interpreted to suggest that reducing the rate of substi-
tutability between personnel skill types or between equip-
ment types enhances the maximum capability of the unit.
This interpretation appears to give a misleading or an inac-
curate representation of unit capability, and also raises
questions concerning the possible benefits received from the
cross- training of personnel. Confidence intervals for the
capability values are provided by the AMORE output. It is
recommended that, when comparing the results of two or more
AMORE runs, an examination of these confidence intervals be
conducted in order to determine whether or not a significant
difference exists between the maximum capabilities reported.
For the example described above, the maximum capability
values resulting from these two AMORE runs were found to be
not significantly different.
According to the AMORE User's Handbook, changes in the
transfer times will change the rate of recovery but will not
change the total capability recovered [Ref. 4: p. 2-102]. It
has been demonstrated that this is not always the case.
Reasons for the possible causes of this misrepresentation
require a detailed discussion of the underlying algorithms
and subroutine structure of the AMORE simulation computer
code. A discussion of these structures is presented in
Chapter II.
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VII. MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
A. DEVELOPING MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
The quantification of the combat capability of a mili-
tary organization is subject to a wide range of conceptuali-
zation and interpretation. The AMORE approach provides a
unique method of defining and quantifying the capability of
a military unit. This method is based on a preliminary
analysis of a specific unit mission, followed by a detailed
examination of the unit's assets which are required for
contribution to the successful accomplishment of that
mission.
The AMORE methodology requires that the user define
capability in terms of mission essential teams. Each
mission essential team, or MET, represents an increment of
capability which contributes to mission accomplishment. In
order to assist the user in developing a MET structure for
the unit under investigation, the AMORE User's Handbook
[Ref. 4: p. 2- 19] provides the following guidelines:
1. The user should answer the question: if only one
increment of capability could be built, what should
it contain?
2. Next: if only two increments of capability could be
built, what should they contain?
3. The 2nd increment of capability will be the differ-
.
ence between the answers to the above two questions.
4. This process is continued until all functions neces-
sary for mission accomplishment are accounter for.
The AMORE method requires that a separate MET structure be
developed for personnel assets and equipment assets.
58
TABLE X
Base; Case Personne 1 METs
MET MET MET MET MET MET MET MET











Tac Comm Ch 1
Tac Wire Ch 1
Tac Wire Sp 1
Tac Wire Sp 1
Pit Ldr 1 1
Pit Sgt 1 1
Veh Dvr 2 1 1
Fire Dir Off 1
Ch FD Cmptr 1




Ch Sect 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gunner 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ammo Tm Ch 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cannoneer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ammo Veh Dvr 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SP How Dvr 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cannoneer 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ammo Sect Ch 1 1
Ammo Spec 1 1
Ammo Hdlr 1 1
Sr Ammo Dvr 1 1
Ammo Dvr 1 1 1 1
An example of this process is illustrated by examining
the personnel MET structure used for the base case, Table X.
If only one increment of capability could be built for this
howitzer battery, it should contain, as a minimum, the
personnel assets required for delivering artillery indirect
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fire. In this case, these assets include the personnel
needed to operate one howitzer, the personnel needed to
accomplish fire direction tasks, and the personnel needed to
establish communication between howitzer personnel and fire
direction personnel. When the user defines the 1st MET in
this way, he is declaring that the mission of providing
sustained artillery indirect fire cannot be accomplished
with fewer personnel assets than those specified.
Examination of the 2nd MET reveals that this next increment
calls for additional
.
personnel to man a 2nd howitzer, and
personnel needed to supervise two howitzer sections. This
procedure was continued in the development of the remaining
six mission essential teams.
It is important to note that the AMORE simulation treats
the building of capability in a cumulative manner. It
accomplishes this by aggregating the assets in the specified
sequence of mission essential teams developed by the user.
For example, the AMORE simulation would insure that the
requirements of the first four METs are satisfied before
allowing the 5th MET to be built. Thus, the requirements of
the 5th MET (the 5th level of capability) consists of all
the assets in METs 1 through 5 in Table X.
B. CHANGING MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAM REQUIREMENTS
It is apparent that the levels of capability reported as
output from the AMORE model are strongly influenced by the
manner in which the user defines the mission essential
teams. In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the AMORE
simulation to changes in user defined MET requirements, the
following demonstration was conducted.
The AMORE model was run using three different sets of
input data. One set consisted of the base case input data.
The 2nd set consisted of the same data with one minor
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modification: the number of Cannoneers per team, (5th from
the bottom in Table X ), was changed from 4 to 3. For the
3rd data set, this number was changed from 4 to 5. For the
purpose of this demonstration, this particular skill level
(the Cannoneer) was selected as the mission essential team
member to be manipulated because this selection provides the
most flexibility. There are 4 Cannoneers required for each
team, and examination of the personnel transfer matrix,
Table III, reveals that there exists numerous other
personnel skills which can be substituted into the Cannoneer
position. The results of these trials are displayed in
Figure 7.1.
Examination of the curves in Figure 7.1 reveals that
there exists a noticeable difference in the recovery rates
of the three trials. A difference in the maximum capabili-
ties achieved in the three trials is also evident. These
results demonstrate that the user's selection of the
elements comprising each mission essential team may have a
significant impact on the capability levels reported by the
model
.
C. CHANGING THE NUMBER OF MISSION ESSENTIAL TEAMS
The number of mission essential teams used in defining
the capability of a unit is dependent upon the user's anal-
ysis of mission requirements and available assets. Two
different users may develop two different MET structures for
the same organization based on separate, but valid, anal-
yses.
.
These different analyses of the same organization may
be manifested in the form of MET structures which use
different numbers of mission essential teams to describe
that organization's increments of capability. The number of
mission essential teams defined by the user may have a




Effects of Changing Mission Essential Team (MET) Requirements
Solid Line: Results using Base Case MET Structure.
Dotted Line: Results using Base Case MET Structure modified
by requiring 1 less Cannoneer per team.
Dashed Line: Results using Base Case MET Structure modified
by requiring 1 more Cannoneer per team.
-L _L
Time (hours)
Figure 7.1 Changing MET Requirements.
In order to demonstrate this, two alternate analyses of
the howitzer battery mission requirements resulted in the
formulation of two additional MET structures (different from
the structure defined in the base case). These alternate
structures, displayed in Tables XI and XII, both represent
valid interpretations of the increments of howitzer battery
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The MET structure displayed in Table XI reveals 16
increments or teams. This structure will be referred to as
Alternative A. This structure, which is similar to the one
developed for the base case (Table X), is based upon the
eight howitzer sections in the battery, with each section
consisting of ten men. For the base case, this resulted in
8 mission essential teams. For Alternative A, each ten man
section was analyzed to consist of two teams of five men
each, resulting in 16 teams. Thus, both the base case
structure and the structure for Alternative A represent
valid, but different, definitions of increments of howitzer
battery capability.
The MET structure displayed in Table XII was developed
in a similar manner. This structure will be referred to as
Alternative B. Alternative B defines capability with 24
teams, based on another way of organizing the duties within
a ten man howitzer section. For Alternative B, each ten man
section was analyzed to consist of two teams of four men
each, plus a third team consisting of two men dedicated to
the performance of support functions within the section.
Thus, within each of the eight howitzer sections, there
exists three increments of capability, resulting in 24
increments for the entire battery.
In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the AMORE
simulation to changes in the MET structure, the results
generated by the input of Alternatives A and B were compared
to the results generated by the base case input. A compar-
ison of these outputs is presented in Figure 7.2.
Examination of the curves in Figure 7.2 reveals that
different recovery rates were reported for each of the three
trials. There is also an indication that the maximum capa-
bilities achieved by each of the trials were not the same.
These results should not be used to determine if one
alternative MET structure is more acceptable than another.
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Figure 7.2 Changing MET Structure.
The results of these trials serve to demonstrate that the
number of mission essential teams used as input to the AM0RE
model. can result in a noticeable difference in the output
generated by the model. For example, the curves displayed
in Figure 7.2 show that, at timeslice = 0.5 hours, there
appears to be large differences between the reported capa-
bilities of the three MET structures. In order to under-
stand how the number of mission essential teams impacts on
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the output of the AMORE model, a detailed discussion of the
algorithms and subroutines used in this simulation is
required. A detailed explanation of how the input MET
information interfaces with these subroutines is presented
in Chapter II.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A . SUMMARY
The results presented in Chapters IV through VII provide
guidance and recommendations regarding the formulation of
the AMORE input information. These chapters also demon-
strate how selected changes in the input information can
affect the output generated by the model. An explanation of
how these changes produced the demonstrated results has been
provided through an analysis of the algorithms used in the
AMORE model. Conclusions based upon the results of this
analysis are summarized below.
1. The AMORE methodology interprets capability strictly
as a function of the availability of personnel and
materiel assets. Other measures of performance are
not considered by this approach.
2. The AMORE approach of transforming availability into
capability is based upon a number of simplifying
assumptions, which may present limitations on the
applications of the model. Some specific limitations
are discussed in the Recommendations section below.
3. The results obtained using the particular base case
organization chosen for this investigation illustrate
that the AMORE model displays sensitivity to changes
in each of the input factors examined. For the base
case, controlled changes in the input factors
produced the expected consequences in all cases
except for those cases involving changes to input
transfer times. However, the unexpected consequences
obtained by increasing selected transfer times can be




4. The mission essential team input can significantly
affect the output capabilities reported by the model.
Because the model treats the mission essential teams
as the building blocks of capability, alternative MET
structures have a more significant impact on resul-
tant capbility analyses than changes in any other
input factors.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO USERS OF THE MODEL
Based on the results of this investigation, the
following recommendations are provided:
1. Users of this model must be cognizant of the AMORE
definition of capability. Based on this definition,
the user must be satisfied that the desired measure
of effectiveness is consistent with the AMORE measure
of effectiveness before any application of the meth-
odology is attempted.
2. Users of this model should have a thorough under-
standing of the assumptions inherent in the use of
the AMORE algorithm in order to conduct a valid
interpretation of the AMORE results. These assump-
tions are listed in Chapter II.
3. The results of an AMORE analysis should be used to
provide insight or to identify trends in organiza-
tional capability. However, the output from the
model should not be used to provide point estimates
of capability. For example, the model can be used
.
for purposes of comparison, as an aid to evaluating
candidate organizational structures. The model
should not be used to predict the effectiveness of a
particular organization in a specified scenario,
based upon capability levels reported as output from
an AMORE simulation.
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It is recommended that the AMORE output not be used
to compare the recovery rates of candidate organiza-
tions, unless the maximum capabilities generated by
the AMORE runs for the organizations are the same.
The user must be aware that the recovery rates
reported by the model are based upon a solution to
the linear program which maximizes capability, not
recoverability
. Recovery rates based upon sub-
optimal solutions to the assignment problem are not
reported by the model.
It is recommended that the user examine the confi-
dence intervals which are provided as output for each
of the capability values reported. When comparing
the results of two or more complete runs, an exami-
nation of these confidence intervals will indicate if
a significant difference exists between the maximum
capabilities reported for each run. The user may
increase the number of iterations in order to
increase the size of the sample of survivor sets,
thus decreasing the confidence intervals until the
desired limits are obtained.
In the formulation of input information required by
the model, the user should give considerable emphasis
to the Mission Essential Team input. The correct
formulation of this input information is critical to
the valid application of the AMORE methodology. The
formulation of this input factor requires the user to
define explicitly the structure to be used by the
model for generating and reporting quantifications of
organizational capability. Furthermore, the user is
forced to define capability in discrete increments
which are treated as equivalent slices of capability
by the AMORE model. For many organizational mission
requirements, this structuring may not be
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appropriate. An in-depth preliminary analysis of the
unit's mission must be conducted in order to deter-
mine the suitability of the current AMORE require-
ments for the organization under examination. In
conducting this analysis, it is recommended that the
user initially not consider the available organiza-
tional assets, but consider only the mission require-
ments of the unit under investigation. Based on an
analysis of these requirements, the user should then
attempt to identify those organizational assets which
can be used to constitute teams which contribute
equally to the fulfillment of the mission require-
ments. For non-homogenous units and for organiza-
tions with diversified mission requirements, the user
may be restricted to applying the AMORE simulation to
those specific mission requirements for which equal
increments of capability can be defined.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MODEL ENHANCEMENT
Based on an examination of the AMORE algorithm and the
results of the base case trials, the following recommenda-
tions for model enhancement are provided.
1. For those applications in which the user desires to
examine the effects of personnel cross- training or
equipment inter-operability , the AMORE simulation in
its present form may provide misleading results (as
demonstrated in Chapter VI). These misrepresenta-
.
tions are the result of the process by which the
AMORE simulation is designed to select values from a
generated random number stream. Values are selected
from different points in the random number stream
based upon the transfer times input to the model.
These values are then used in a Monte Carlo process
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which determines the sets of surviving assets. In
some instances in which the user desires to examine
the effects of changes in transfer times, it may be
desireable to insure that the sample sets of survi-
vors between sequential AMORE runs are consistent.
It is recommended that an additional and alternative
version of the AMORE simulation, in which random
numbers are selected from the same point in the
generated stream, be provided for this purpose.
The current requirement to define capability in terms
of equally weighted increments is not readily suit-
able to non-homogenous organizations or organizations
with diversified mission requirements. As a proposed
enhancement to the current method, it is recommended
that the AMORE model be revised to permit the user to
specify mission essential teams which will not neces-
sarily be treated as equally weighted increments of
capability. This can be accomplished by requiring
the user to provide, in addition to the required MET
input, a scale of values ranging from to 100%, with
one value corresponding to each cumulative MET
defined. For example, consider a situation in which
the user specifies, as input, 10 mission essential
teams. If, during one iteration of the AMORE run,
surviving assets were determined to fulfill all the
requirements of the first 8 METs , a value of 80%
capability would be calculated and recorded by the
model, under the current version. Under the proposed
revision, the same surviving assets which fulfilled
all the requirements of the same 8 METs could corre-
spond to 50%, 91%, or any percentage defined by the
user to represent the capability available in the
assets of those 8 increments. This recommendation
would entail some major modifications to the existing
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AMORE computer code, and would involve additional
storage of input factors to be used within the itera-
tion loop. However, this enhancement would provide
greater flexibility to the user and increased appli-
cability of the model for future use.
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